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Eichmann in Jerusalem—and in West 
Germany: Eichmann Trial Witnesses and the 
West German Prosecution of Operation 
Reinhard Crimes, 1958–1966 
MICHAEL BRYANT* 
For to what lengths will that man go in the dark who fears nothing 
but a witness and a judge? 
—Cicero, Laws 
The trial of Adolf Eichmann fifty years ago was a landmark in 
several respects. It marked not only the prosecution of an important 
génocidaire who had placed his energies and talents in the service of the 
Final Solution, but also furnished the survivors and the families of the 
victims a world stage from which to tell their personal stories of 
persecution at the Nazis’ hands. In contrast with the Nuremberg war 
crimes trial, which, in preferring documentary evidence to personal 
testimony, had deemphasized the singularity of the Holocaust, the 
Eichmann trial restored the voices of Jewish victims directly affected by 
Eichmann’s actions. In the decades since the Eichmann trial many 
scholars have observed these historic aspects.1 One feature of the 
Eichmann trial that has received less attention from scholars is its 
impact on West German prosecutions of Holocaust crimes.   
Coincidentally, Eichmann’s arrest and trial occurred at roughly the 
same time that West Germany was intensifying efforts to locate Nazi 
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 1. On the “trial by document” at Nuremberg, see TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF 
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1993); LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY 
OF JUDGMENT 11–94 (2001); BRADLEY F. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 
(1977); MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL, 1945–46 (1977); DONALD 
BLOXHAM, GENOCIDE ON TRIAL (2001). On the opportunities afforded by the Eichmann trial for 
Jewish victim testimony, see LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT 97–182 
(2001); DAVID CESARANI, BECOMING EICHMANN 250–51, 268 (2004).  
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offenders within its own borders and bring them to trial.2 In this essay, I 
will explore some of the contributions to West German Holocaust trials 
rendered by Jewish survivors who also testified at the Eichmann trial. I 
will suggest that these contributions were not only valuable to the West 
German trials, but essential to their success as well. Jewish witnesses 
provided West German courts with evidence critical to proving specific 
crimes by former death camp guards and to classifying the defendants 
as perpetrators of, rather than accomplices to, the mass murder of the 
Jews. Without their testimony, some of the worst lower-level offenders 
within the Nazi death camp system would likely have either escaped 
judicial punishment altogether or received reduced sentences. 
For purposes of economy, I will focus on the major West German 
trials of the three “Operation Reinhard” death camps: Belzec, Treblinka, 
and Sobibor. As described in fuller detail below, Operation Reinhard 
was the program set in motion in October 1941, when Heinrich 
Himmler, chief of the SS, entrusted the destruction of the Jewish 
population in Poland’s “General Government” (the part of Poland not 
incorporated into the Reich) to SS Police Leader of the Lublin district, 
Odilo Globocnik.3 It was Globocnik who organized the construction of 
Belzec, Treblinka, and Sobibor as literal murder centers to annihilate 
the 2,284,000 Jews of the General Government.4  
I will further narrow the scope of this article by focusing on the 
defendants in these trials convicted as perpetrators of mass murder 
under the German homicide law (§ 211, StGB). An exception will be 
made respecting the Belzec trial where, for purposes of contrasting the 
drastically different outcome of this abortive case with the relatively 
successful results in the Treblinka and Sobibor proceedings, I will 
examine the acquittals of seven of the eight defendants and the final 
conviction of the eighth, Josef Oberhauser, as an accomplice to murder. 
Only four defendants were convicted as perpetrators of murder in the 
three major Operation Reinhard cases: none in the Belzec trial, three in 
the Treblinka trial, and one in the Sobibor proceeding.5 As we will see, 
 
 2. In 1960, West Germany asked Argentina to extradite Josef Mengele, the Nazi doctor 
who performed medical experiments on prisoners in Auschwitz. See e.g., The Search for 
Perpetrators, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM, 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005167 (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).  
 3. Aktion Reinhard, YAD VASHEM, 
http://www1.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/microsoft%20word%20-%205724.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 
2012). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Kurt Bolender, a defendant who would have surely been convicted as a perpetrator in the 
Sobibor trial, committed suicide before the end of the trial. See DICK DE MILDT, IN THE NAME OF 
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Eichmann trial witnesses were indispensable to their convictions as 
mass murderers warranting the harshest punishment under West 
German law. 
I.  BELZEC, SOBIBOR, TREBLINKA:  A PRIMER ON THE OPERATION 
REINHARD CAMPS, 1941-1943 
The death camp was the apotheosis of Nazi Jewish policy, which 
from the beginning had dreamt of ridding the German Reich of its 
Jewish population.6 Throughout the 1930s that policy had advanced 
from the curtailment of Jewish civil liberties, to the marking and 
segregation of Jews from “Aryan” society, and then to the confiscation 
of their property.7 By the summer and fall of 1941, the penultimate 
stage of this policy, which called for Jewish expulsion and resettlement 
to places like Nisko near Lublin and the French colony of Madagascar, 
had become impracticable. In October 1941, the Nazi leadership 
decided to solve the “Jewish problem” through an infinitely more 
radical means—the physical extermination of every Jew within its 
reach.8  
It is a cruel coincidence of history that this decision was taken 
shortly after Hitler formally ended the “euthanasia” program in August 
1941.9 In the two years prior to its official discontinuance, the Nazi 
leadership, through Hitler’s personal chancellery, had administered 
“Operation T-4”— a program for the mass murder of the mentally 
disabled at six primary killing sites inside the German Reich.10 A gas 
chamber disguised as a shower room, complete with phony 
showerheads unconnected to any waterline, was installed at each of 
these sites.11 Some 30 patients could be gassed within 20 to 30 minutes 
 
THE PEOPLE: PERPETRATORS OF GENOCIDE IN THE REFLECTION OF THEIR POST-WAR 
PROSECUTION 257–61, 276, 281 (1996).  
 6. CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION: THE EVOLUTION 
OF NAZI JEWISH POLICY, SEPTEMBER 1939–MARCH 1942 424–27 (2004). 
 7. On the structure of Nazi Jewish policy (definition, expropriation, concentration, 
annihilation), see 1 RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS, 49–59 (2003) 
[hereinafter HILBERG I]. 
 8. THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 6, at 318.  
 9. Id. at 192. 
 10. Id. at 190–91.  The mental hospitals chosen as killing sites were Bernburg, Hadamar, 
Brandenburg, Grafeneck, Sonnenstein, and Hartheim. Hitler’s Chancellery administered the 
program through offices located at Tiergartenstrasse No. 4 in Berlin—hence the code name of the 
program, “Operation T-4.” 
 11. DE MILDT, supra note 5, at 60–61. 
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by means of bottled carbon monoxide released into the hermetically 
sealed room.12 
The Nazis also waged their war of extermination against the 
disabled in the Wartheland (the portion of Poland annexed to Germany) 
and East Prussia, where a unit under SS Sturmbannführer Herbert 
Lange murdered the handicapped in “gas vans” disguised as commercial 
vehicles. Lange’s unit bundled the victims at the rear of these vans in 
sealed compartments into which pure carbon monoxide was pumped as 
the van was driven away.13 In late spring of 1940, Lange’s men 
murdered 1,559 German mental patients and 400 Polish patients at the 
Soldau transit camp in East Prussia.14 Between the onset of the 
campaign against the mentally ill, and its termination in August 1941, a 
cadre of experienced killers was groomed, possessing both the will to 
carry out their orders unswervingly and the technical know-how of mass 
extermination.   
When Hitler decided to kill all the European Jews within his grasp, 
his underlings harnessed the expertise of these T-4 murder technicians 
to a series of separate yet interlocking programs, which formed the heart 
of the Final Solution.15 Among the most audacious of these programs 
was “Operation Reinhard,” the effort to kill all of the Jews concentrated 
in the General Government.16 Himmler entrusted its organization and 
administration to his SS and Police Leader for Poland’s Lublin district, 
SS-Obergruppenführer Odilo Globocnik.17   
From late October 1941 until January and February 1942, a 
“commando” of 30 men previously employed in the mass murder of the 
disabled was sent to Lublin.18 These included seasoned euthanasia 
specialists Dr. Irmfried Eberl, director of the T-4 killing centers at 
Brandenburg and Bernburg; Dr. Helmut Kallmeyer, a chemist in the 
Criminal Technical Institute of the Reich Police Office; Christian Wirth, 
 
 12. Id.  
 13. THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 6, at 188–89. 
 14. Id. at 186–89. 
 15. Id. at 416. Himmler had “loaned” SS men to Hitler’s Chancellery for execution of the 
euthanasia program between 1939 and 1941. In the fall of 1941, Himmler “was going to collect 
his debts by taking back his SS personnel experienced in gassing and borrowing some of Viktor 
Brack’s men was [sic] well.” Brack was the deputy of Hitler’s Chancellery and the Chief of its 
Section II, which had primary responsibility for carrying out the “euthanasia” program in 
Germany. The German staffs of the Operation Reinhard camps would ultimately consist of 
hardcore SS men like Kurt Franz and T-4 employees with only nominal ties to the SS.  
 16. The program may have been code-named after the head of the Reich Security Main 
Office, Reinhard Heydrich. 
 17. THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 6, at 419–20.  
 18. Id. at 419.  
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former detective superintendent of the Stuttgart Criminal Police 
Headquarters (a department of the Gestapo) and director of various T-4 
gassing centers; Josef Oberhauser, a T-4 employee and future liaison for 
Wirth; and Dr. Herbert Linden, the Reich Delegate for Mental Hospitals 
and Nursing Homes. 19 Eberl, Kallmeyer, and Linden were among the 
euthanasia personnel assigned by Globocnik in Lublin to construct 
Belzec, the first of the Operation Reinhard death camps.20 The precise 
number of euthanasia operatives sent to establish and administer the 
death camps of occupied Poland is unknown. West German 
investigations into death camp crimes in the 1960s, however, mention a 
figure of 92 former T-4 personnel assigned to Operation Reinhard in 
Lublin.21 
Before it was chosen as a site for Operation Reinhard’s first death 
camp, Belzec was a German labor camp. It was built in early 1940 for 
Jewish slave laborers involved in constructing fortifications on the 
border between Soviet and German territory.22 The labor camp was 
liquidated in the fall of 1940.23 A year after its dissolution, Josef 
Oberhauser was sent to Belzec to supervise the building of a new camp. 
Twenty Polish workers did the actual construction. They erected three 
buildings on the site following the blueprints of an ethnic German 
carpenter.24 The smallest of the three contained three rooms of equal 
size. Each room had stout inner and outer doors capable of being 
secured with crossbars on the outside, and equipped with rubber seals. 
Pipes underlay the floors of the three rooms. The Poles completed the 
job on December 22, 1941.25 Thereafter, former Soviet POWs from the 
 
 19. HILBERG I, supra note 7, at 49–53.  
 20. See testimony of Viktor Brack at Nuremberg, contained in the files of the investigation 
and prosecution of Belzec personnel housed in the federal archive at Ludwigsburg, Germany. 
Testimony of Viktor Brack, Oct. 12, 1946, BArch B 162/3168 (Eidesstattliche Erklärung Viktor 
Hermann Brack). Ascertaining the precise identities of all T-4 personnel Brack assigned to 
Globocnik in the fall of 1941 has proven elusive; the names of Eberl, Kallmeyer, and Linden 
were identified by the Sachbearbeiter for the Belzec case, Dietrich Zeug, in June 1960; see id. 
(“Operation Reinhard” Concise Summary of Current Results of Investigations by the Central 
Office of the State Justice Administrations, 9 June 1960). See also Josef Oberhauser 
Interrogation, Sept. 15, 1960, BArch B 162/3169; THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra 
note 6, at 419. 
 21. See e.g., YITZHAK ARAD, BELZEC, SOBIBOR, TREBLINKA: THE OPERATION REINHARD 
DEATH CAMPS 17 (1987). Arad adduces a figure of 450 people assigned to Operation Reinhard: 
153 SS and police under Globocnik’s command in Lublin, 205 SS and police members, and 92 
T-4 personnel.  
 22. THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 6, at 419.  
 23. Id.   
 24. Id. at 419–20.   
 25. Id. at 420.  
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Ukraine, trained after their capture at the SS training center at Trawniki 
(Lublin), installed a ramp along the north face of the small building and 
a rail line that led into an adjacent field.26 In this field the Ukrainians 
excavated a large trench.27 The ethnic German carpenter informed 
Oberhauser that the small building would be a gas chamber.28  
Around this same time, Christian Wirth became commandant of 
Belzec, and Oberhauser became his emissary to Globocnik in Lublin.29 
Under Wirth, Jewish workers built the guard towers and remaining 
buildings on the site.30 Wirth also introduced an innovation in the killing 
technology inspired by his work with the euthanasia program. He 
rejected bottled carbon monoxide in favor of using a diesel engine as a 
poison gas generator, thereby splicing Lange’s gas van with the 
stationary gas chamber of the euthanasia centers.31 Wirth’s hybrid could 
achieve higher killing rates without reliance on outside providers of 
bottled gas.32 With this technical adaptation, he created the first 
vertically integrated death camp. The influence of Nazi euthanasia was 
evident not only in the choice of personnel and the employment of a 
fixed gas chamber, but also in outward camouflage to deceive the 
victims.33 
In February 1942, Wirth and his men were ready to test their 
brainchild. An experimental gassing was held in which 150 Jewish 
workers were murdered in Belzec’s gas chamber.34 Afterward, Wirth 
departed Belzec for Berlin, but returned in March with his commando 
comprising ex-T-4 men. These individuals were admitted to the SS on 
arrival; they wore the gray uniforms of the SS and were assigned SS 
ranks. Although putatively under Globocnik’s command, they remained 
intimately linked to the offices in Berlin responsible for organizing and 
administering euthanasia.35 They vacationed at an Austrian retreat for 
euthanasia personnel and received additional pay and personal mail 
from a courier employed by euthanasia officials, who visited Lublin 
each week.36 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.; ARAD, supra note 21, at 24.  
 30. THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 6, at 420.  
 31. Id. 
 32. ARAD, supra note 21, at 20–24. 
 33. Id.  
 34. THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION, supra note 6, at 420.  
      35.   ARAD, supra note 21, at 18. 
 36. Id.  
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In the preceding months, the camp had been subdivided into two 
subcamps: the northern and western subcamp, Camp I, was designated 
the reception and administration area; and the eastern subcamp, Camp 
II, was devoted to extermination.37 In mid-March 1942, a transport of 
Jews from Galicia and a subsequent one from the Lublin ghetto arrived 
at Belzec.38 The camp was ready for them. From mid-March to April 14, 
waves of transports washed into Belzec from Polish towns in the Lublin 
district—Zamosc, Piaski, and Izbica. They included 30,000 Jews 
deported from the Lvov district, characterized in Nazi reports as 
“nonworking” Jews—a fatal classification.39 
By mid-April, 75,000 Jews had been killed.40 When the first stage 
of genocide had ended in June 1942, the Jewish death toll at Belzec 
stood at 93,000.41 At this time, the gas chambers were expanded from 
three to six, all disguised as shower facilities. The capacity was more 
than 2,000 victims per gassing, or twenty freight cars.42 Transports to 
Belzec stopped in December 1942, and mass murder ground to a 
permanent halt.43 On Himmler’s orders the camp was razed and 
converted into a farm for occupancy by a Ukrainian guard.44 As many as 
600,000 Polish Jews were killed there.45 Only two Jews deported to 
Belzec survived.46 
Belzec was the model for the two other death camps of Operation 
Reinhard: Sobibor and Treblinka. Richard Thomalla, an agent of the SS 
Central Building Administration (which had also commissioned the 
building of Belzec), headed the project to construct a death camp near 
the village of Sobibor, located eight kilometers south of Wlodaway in 
the Lublin district.47 Local Poles were hired to build the camp and 80 
Jews from local ghettos were sent there to assist in the construction. 
They toiled under the watchful eyes of Ukrainian guards from 
 
 37. Id. at 27. 
 38. Id. at 72. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 73. 
 42. Id. at 74. 
 43. Id. at 126. 
 44. Id. at 371. 
 45. Id. at 127. Polish Jewish victims at Belzec alone accounted for 414,000 victims. Arad 
reaches the 600,000 figure by adding the tens of thousands of Jews from other European countries 
deported to Lublin ghettos who were later murdered in the Belzec camp.  Arad’s figure is 
primarily based on the report prepared by the Polish Committee to Investigate Nazi Crimes in 
Occupied Poland, and matches the estimate of the state court of Munich at Josef Oberhauser’s 
trial in 1965. It is the most commonly accepted estimate of Jewish fatalities at Belzec. 
 46. DE MILDT, supra note 5, at 276.  
 47. ARAD, supra note 21, at 30. 
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Trawniki.48 Once the camp was done, these Jewish workers were 
murdered.49  
Globocnik appointed Franz Stangl, another T-4 man, as the first 
commandant of Sobibor, schooling him in techniques of industrialized 
Jew-killing through a crash course at Belzec.50 Here he encountered 
Christian Wirth, whom he first met on the edge of a knoll overlooking a 
pit filled with thousands of corpses.51  
The Sobibor camp was segmented into three sub-camps. Camp I 
consisted of the entrance, a railroad ramp, and lodging for the camp 
staff and work Jews.52 Camp II was a reception area, in which recently 
arrived Jews disrobed and where their possessions were sorted and 
stored by camp staff.53 The “tube,” a passage enclosed in barbwire and 
interwoven tree branches, joined Camp II to the extermination area at 
Camp III.54 Guards drove the victims through the tube into the gas 
chambers. After gassing, the corpses were dumped into trenches 10 
meters by 15 meters wide and 5 meters by 7 meters deep.55  
Between May and November 1942, at least 75,000 Jews from 
Lublin ghettos were transported to their deaths in Sobibor.56 Genocide 
crested there in three successive waves: May to June 1942, October to 
November 1942, and March to July 1943.57 In the intervals between 
these three waves, smaller transports of Jews arrived in the camps in 
trucks and horse-drawn vehicles.58 The state court of Hagen suggested in 
its 1966 verdict in the main Sobibor trial that these smaller transports of 
Jews may have bypassed the gassing facilities entirely; instead, they 
might have been led directly to the trenches in Camp III and shot.59 
When Sobibor was closed in November 1943, it had murdered 
between 150,000 and 250,000 Jewish deportees.60 Unlike its forerunner 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. C.F. RUETER & D.W. DE MILDT, 25 JUSTIZ UND NS-VERBRECHEN 84–88 (State Court 
of Hagen, Case No. 642a) (2001). 
      53.  Id. 
      54.  Id. 
      55.  Id. 
      56. See ARAD, supra note 21, at 80. The figure of 75,000 is from the state court of Hagen’s 
1966 verdict in the main Sobibor trial. RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 52, at 84. Arad cites a 
higher figure of 90,000–100,000 gassed between May and July 1942 alone.  
       57.   ARAD, supra note 21, at 80–86.  
      58.   Id. 
     59. RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 52, at 88. 
 60. There are wide disparities in the figures cited in the literature. Arad adheres to a figure 
of 250,000, based on a transport size of 2,000–2,500 deportees. See e.g., Arad, Die ‘Aktion 
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and model, Belzec, Sobibor’s awful harvest of human lives was not 
complete: a revolt within the camp in October 1943 enabled scores of 
prisoners to escape. Most were recaptured and murdered, but thirty or 
more eluded their captors and survived the war.61 Some of these 
prisoners would later return to testify against their tormentors as 
witnesses at the main Sobibor trial in 1965.62 
Of the three camps administered by Globocnik from his 
headquarters in Lublin, the champion of mass death was Treblinka, 
located 65 miles northeast of Warsaw. Among Nazi murder sites 
scattered across German-occupied Europe, only Auschwitz-Birkenau 
claimed more Jewish lives than Treblinka.63 It consisted of two sub 
camps—a labor camp for Polish gentiles and Polish Jews from the 
Warsaw district (Treblinka I),64 and an extermination center (Treblinka 
II).65 When the construction of the death camp began in late May-early 
June 1942, genocide at Belzec and Sobibor was already in full swing. 
Sobibor’s builder, Richard Thomalla, was the head of the Treblinka 
construction team.66 The work teams that built the camp consisted of 
Polish and Jewish prisoners from Treblinka I. All of the Jewish 
prisoner-workers were eventually murdered. As if to consecrate the site 
in an unholy baptism, the German overseers killed and brutalized the 
Jewish laborers during Treblinka II’s erection.67 A Polish prisoner 
involved in the labor team at Treblinka recalled that, “during the felling 
of forests, [the SS] forced Jews to stand beneath the trees which were 
 
Reinhard’: Gaskammern in Ostpolen, in NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE MASSENTÖTUNGEN DURCH 
GIFTGAS 177 (1983). His figures square with estimates by the state prosecutor of Hagen in the 
main Sobibor trial. The higher figures may be based on a judicial report prepared by a Polish 
judge after the war, who conducted interviews of survivors from the Sobibor camp. In his report 
the judge affirmed that 250,000 victims were murdered at Sobibor. He arrived at this estimate 
based on a transport size of 2,000 to 4,000 Jews, figures provided by a Polish railroad engineer. 
The Hagen state court was persuaded, by contrast, that the documentation on transports from 
Germany, France, and Czechoslovakia (the “Protectorate”) showed a transport strength of 1,000 
people. With this lower number as its touchstone, the court offered a conservative estimate of 
150,000 Jews murdered at Sobibor. The expert witness (Sachverständiger), Wolfgang Scheffler, 
cited a figure of 151,000; the lay assessors (Schöffen) believed the number stood at 152,000. 
RUETER & DE MILDT, supra note 52, at 89 (Hagen Regional Court Verdict in the criminal case of 
Kurt Bolender et al.). 
     61. ARAD, supra note 21, at 40. 
     62. Id. 
     63. See 3 RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS, 1320 (2003) 
[hereinafter HILBERG III].  
     64. ARAD, supra note 21, at 37. 
     65. See id. at 40–43. 
     66. Id. at 37. 
     67. Id. at 40. 
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about to fall down,” thereby causing the deaths of four Jewish workers.68 
The SS supervisors conducted raids of the Jewish quarters, in which 
they killed the Jews on the spot.69 These early acts of senseless cruelty 
were only a preview of what would follow. 
The extermination camp opened in July 1942 under its first 
commandant, Dr. Irmfried Eberl, the former director of the T-4 
euthanasia centers at Brandenburg and Bernburg.70 Its purpose was to 
eradicate the 366,000 Jews in the Warsaw district, as well as Jewish 
populations in Radom, Lublin, and Bialystok. 29,000 other European 
Jews and thousands of Roma would perish in the gas chambers of 
Treblinka during its one and one half year existence. At first, the camp 
operated with three gas chambers, each measuring four meters by four 
meters wide and 2.6 meters high.71 Following the pattern at Belzec and 
Sobibor, they were disguised as showers: the ceilings of each chamber 
were equipped with pipes and showerheads.72 Conveying the illusion of 
a functional bath, the pipes routed carbon monoxide gas into the 
chamber from a diesel engine located in an attached room.73  
In late August to early September 1942, a “large gas chamber” was 
built to improve the deadly work of the “small” ones, which had proven 
inadequate to the tasks demanded of them.74 The brick building housing 
the larger facility consisted of five gas chambers, five meters by five 
meters wide and two meters high.75 Otherwise, the large gas chamber 
resembled the smaller facility. Pipes conducted carbon monoxide 
exhaust from a diesel engine installed in the adjacent “machine room.”76  
After arrival in the camp, the deportees were “selected” for either 
labor or extermination in the reception area.77 The latter group disrobed 
in a barrack before being herded naked, blows from clubs, whips, and 
fists raining down on them, through a “tube” connecting the reception 
area to the gas chambers.78 The smaller chambers killed as many as 300 
 
 68. Id.   
 69. Id. at 39–40.  
 70. Rael D. Strous, Dr. Irmfried Eberl (1910–1948): Mass Murdering MD, 11 IMAJ 216, 
217 (2009). 
 71. ARAD, supra note 21, at 42. 
 72. Id. at 42. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Treblinka, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM, 
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005193 (last visited Feb. 4, 2013). 
 78. Id. 
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persons, and the larger 400 persons, at a time.79 After gassing, Jewish 
work teams searched all the corpses for hidden valuables.80 The corpses 
were then dragged to the burial pits, where they were covered with thin 
layers of sand. In May 1943, two crematoria were installed, in which the 
bodies of the victims were incinerated immediately after gassing.81   
As at Sobibor, a prisoner revolt erupted late in Treblinka’s 
existence. It began on August 2, 1943, led by work Jews sensing that 
the camp, along with themselves, would soon be liquidated.82 Prisoners 
gained access to the armory, secured weapons, and attacked the SS.83 
They also set some of the camp buildings on fire as other prisoners 
sought escape over the fence.84 Most were mowed down by guards 
shooting from the camp watchtowers,85 and the majority of successful 
escapees were later recaptured and shot anyway.86 Of the 750 fugitives, 
only 70 survived Treblinka’s liquidation.87 Some of these survivors 
joined their counterparts from Sobibor and appeared as witnesses 
against camp personnel at the West German Treblinka trial in 1964.88 
In the aftermath of the Treblinka uprising, the camp commandant, 
Franz Stangl, made preparations to close the camp.89 When Stangl was 
sent to fight partisans in Trieste, he was replaced by Kurt Franz. Franz 
ordered that any trace of the crimes committed at Treblinka be 
obliterated.90 He oversaw the demolition of the camp by 100 work 
Jews.91 When it had been razed, all the work Jews were shot.92 Trees 
were planted on the grounds and the site was given to a former 
Ukrainian guard as a farm.93 
When the last of the camps of Operation Reinhard were dismantled 
in the fall of 1943, they had claimed the lives of nearly 1.8 million 
 
 79. ARAD, supra note 21, at 354. 
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Jews.94 Although the Nazis continued to murder Jews at Auschwitz-
Birkenau and other sites well after the closure of Belzec, Sobibor, and 
Treblinka, the frightful work of annihilation at these camps accounts for 
more than one-third of the Holocaust’s victims.95   
II.  BACKGROUND OF THE WEST GERMAN OPERATION REINHARD TRIALS 
Given the enormity of the crimes committed at Belzec, Sobibor, 
and Treblinka, it may appear scandalous that many death camp 
perpetrators avoided punishment for their crimes until the 1960s, 
particularly in West German courts. In fact, the reasons for the belated 
confrontation with these lower-level killers in West Germany are 
complex. The International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) at Nuremberg 
(1945–46), although touching on the extermination of the Jews, by no 
means foregrounded the Nazis’ Final Solution.96 The only death camp 
commandant available to testify at the IMT was Rudolf Hoess, the 
former commandant of Auschwitz.97 While Hoess testified about the 
existence of other death camps—specifically identifying Belzec and 
Treblinka—the proceedings of the Tribunal scarcely addressed 
Operation Reinhard.98 These failures of judicial representation were 
understandable given the Allies’ lack of knowledge at this time of the 
immensity of Nazi genocide—an ignorance they shared with the 
German judicial authorities.99   
Unawareness of the colossal proportions of the Holocaust was not 
the only reason that the major West German trials of death camp killers 
did not occur until the 1960s. Limits imposed by the Allies on German 
courts’ jurisdiction over Nazi crimes also contributed to the delay. The 
Allies closed all German courts in May 1945, only to reopen them 
months later with significant restrictions on their jurisdiction over Nazi-
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era crimes.100 Under the Allied Control Council Law #10 (December 
1945), German courts were only able to hear criminal cases involving 
German defendants and German victims.101  
A burst of prosecutions of Nazi crimes in German courts followed. 
Between 1945 and 1949—before the establishment of West and East 
Germany—German courts convicted 4,500 Nazi defendants of crimes 
committed during the Third Reich, a figure that approaches the numbers 
convicted in Allied military courts.102 None of these convictions related 
to the genocide committed in the Operation Reinhard death camps. 
Control Council Law #10 withheld from German courts any jurisdiction 
over Nazi crimes inflicted on Allied nationals, and most of the victims 
of the Operation Reinhard camps were Poles whose murders were thus 
beyond the reach of German law.  
German courts in the western half of the country first encountered 
Operation Reinhard in the course of their investigations into euthanasia 
crimes.103 Because the principal victims of the Nazi “euthanasia” of the 
disabled were German nationals, these crimes fell within the jurisdiction 
of the restored German judiciary as defined by Control Council Law 
#10. In July 1946, the Frankfurt police arrested a mechanic named Josef 
Hirtreiter on suspicion of involvement in the murder of the disabled at 
the Hadamar killing center.104 While the charges against him were 
ultimately dropped, in his interrogations by police Hirtreiter spoke of 
his assignment to the “Malkinia” camp where Jews were gassed.105 A 
July 1948 Frankfurt newspaper account reported that Hirtreiter had been 
sentenced by a denazification court to 10 years of forced labor for his 
participation in gassing as many as 5,000 Jews in the “concentration 
camp Malkinia.”106  
Alerted by the article on Hirtreiter, the Frankfurt prosecutor 
launched an investigation into the Malkinia camp, which revealed that 
the camp in question, although located near the hamlet of Malkinia, was 
in fact Treblinka.107 The prosecutor expanded his investigation to 
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include Hubert Gomerski and Johann Klier - two men Hirtreiter had 
identified in his 1946 interrogations as working with him in the Sobibor 
death camp.108 Two Jewish survivors of Sobibor, Samuel Lerer and 
Esther Raab, recognized a third Hirtreiter co-worker, Erich Bauer, when 
they ran into him on the Kreuzberg fairgrounds in Berlin in 1949.109 
When Raab recognized Bauer, he replied in astonishment, “How is it 
that you are still alive?”110 Lerer and Raab reported Bauer to the police, 
and he was arrested.111 Both Raab and Lerer would later testify as 
survivor-witnesses in the 1965 Sobibor trial. 
In 1950 a Berlin court tried and convicted Bauer, a gassing 
technician at Sobibor, of murder as a perpetrator.112 Initially sentenced 
to death (at that time, a murder conviction as a perpetrator carried with 
it an automatic death sentence), his sentence was commuted to a life 
prison term when the new West German state abolished capital 
punishment.113 Gomerski and Klier were also tried in 1950, with 
radically different results. Largely on the strength of Jewish survivor 
testimony proving his acts were gratuitously cruel and sadistic, 
Gomerski was convicted of murder as a perpetrator.114 Klier, however, 
was acquitted based on his unrebutted defense of duress, a commonly 
invoked defense in the later Operation Reinhard trials.115   
Hirtreiter’s trial followed in March 1951, a proceeding 
characterized by such lurid but credible accusations against the 
defendant that the regional court judges hesitated at first to accept 
them.116 When they had satisfied themselves of the veracity of the 
witnesses and the authenticity of their stories, the judges convicted 
Hirtreiter of murder as a perpetrator.117 Both he and his ex-colleague 
Gomerski received life prison terms, the harshest punishment under 
West German law after abolition of the death penalty.118   
Thus, the West German judiciary had acquaintance with the crimes 
of Operation Reinhard and Jewish survivor witnesses long before the 
major death camp trials of the 1960s. These first encounters with 
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Operation Reinhard, however, were fortuitous. Hirtreiter’s name arose 
only because of the Frankfurt prosecutor’s investigation into Nazi 
euthanasia, as did the names he identified during his police 
interrogations, Gomerski and Klier. Bauer’s prosecution was possible 
only because of his chance meeting with two survivors of Sobibor who 
were able to recognize him four years after the war’s end. Before the 
formation of a central clearinghouse devoted to documenting Nazi 
crimes in 1958, criminal investigations typically began when private 
citizens filed a Strafanzeige (“report of crime”) against a person 
suspected of violating the German penal code.119 Such a system, as 
applied to former death camp personnel, was clearly unworkable given 
the paucity of survivors available to report a suspect to the police.   
Other factors also contributed to the rarity of death camp trials in 
West Germany between 1951 and 1960. For one, the West Germans 
lacked both documentation from, and basic knowledge of, the Final 
Solution for years.120 For another, state and federal criminal police ranks 
were full of ex-Nazi officials.121 Furthermore, many witnesses, 
important evidence, and crime scenes themselves were inaccessible 
behind the Iron Curtain. All of these factors created a daisy chain of 
impediments to prosecuting death camp offenders. 
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One of the most important Holocaust trials in German history, the 
Ulm “Einsatzgruppen” trial of 1958, dramatized the shortcomings in the 
West German punishment of Nazi crimes and opened the door to much-
needed reforms in the Federal Republic. The Ulm proceeding began 
when a civil servant and former SS-Oberführer, Bernhard Fischer-
Schweder, sued for reinstatement to his former civil service position, 
from which he had been removed due to his Nazi past.122 The labor 
court that heard his petition dismissed it, prompting Fischer-Schweder 
to protest his dismissal in a letter to a local newspaper.123 A rabbi 
originally from Lithuania but living at the time in Stuttgart recognized 
Fischer-Schweder as the ex-chief of the State Police field office in 
Tilsit, Lithuania. In September 1955, the rabbi filed a Strafanzeige 
against Fischer-Schweder, alleging his involvement in the shooting of 
Lithuanian Jews during the summer of 1941. In the aftermath of 
Fischer-Schweder’s arrest in May 1956, other participants in the 
massacres were apprehended. In 1958, all the defendants were 
prosecuted in the city of Ulm (state of Baden-Württemberg). They were 
charged with murdering more than 5,500 men, women, and children in 
August 1941 as members of a special commando unit active along the 
German-Lithuanian border.124   
As scholars of the postwar trials have noted, the Ulm trial became 
the model for subsequent prosecutions of Holocaust-related crimes in 
West German courts.125 Prior to 1958, Nazi war criminals, if hauled 
before a court of the Federal Republic, typically faced their judges as 
single individuals.126 The state prosecutor in the Ulm case indicted the 
ten Tilsit defendants as a single group involved in a multifaceted 
criminal transaction—one that encompassed numerous actors. This 
approach influenced the West German trials of “euthanasia doctors,” 
other Einsatzgruppen shooters, and death camp personnel in the 1960s.  
In another regard, too, the Ulm verdict became an archetype for the 
Federal Republic’s trials of Nazi crimes after 1958. Both the indictment 
and the state court’s judgment characterized Hitler, Himmler, and 
Heydrich as the “main perpetrators” of the Holocaust. For the court, this 
meant that these men at the summit of the Nazi state conceived the Final 
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Solution, assumed primary responsibility for it, and used the lower-level 
defendants as tools to achieve their aims. Because the Ulm defendants 
did not inwardly approve of the Final Solution, they were accomplices, 
not perpetrators, in the court’s analysis. Fischer-Schweder was 
accordingly convicted of complicity in murdering 526 Jews and 
sentenced to a ten-year prison term; his co-defendants received prison 
sentences of three to fifteen years.127 
III.  THE CREATION OF THE CENTRAL OFFICE/LUDWIGSBURG 
The 1958 Ulm trial revealed to the West Germans that the 
Nuremberg trials had not cleansed the Federal Republic of Nazi war 
criminals. Instead, the spectacle of ten respectable citizens being 
charged with heinous crimes thirteen years after the war’s end showed 
that mass murderers were living comfortable and anonymous lives in 
the Federal Republic. Many understood that the Ulm case was an 
accident. But for the happenstance that the Stuttgart rabbi recognized 
Fischer-Schweder from his letter in the newspaper, the trial would likely 
have never happened, and the murderers of thousands in Lithuania 
would have continued their postwar lives without fear of punishment.128  
In order to conduct the investigation of Nazi crimes on a more 
systematic basis, the justice ministers of the West German states 
decided in October 1958 to establish an agency devoted to investigating 
and documenting them.129 Headquartered in Ludwigsburg in Baden-
Württemberg, the agency bore the cumbersome title of “the Central 
Office of the State Judicial Administrations for the Investigation of 
National Socialist Violent Crimes” (“Central Office”).130 The creators of 
the Central Office imposed significant restrictions on its jurisdiction. It 
had the power to investigate Nazi crimes and liaise with state justice 
offices, but lacked any prosecutorial authority.131 Once it had completed 
an investigation, the Central Office could do little more than send its 
files to state prosecutors, who would decide whether or not to indict.132 
The Central Office could investigate only Nazi crimes committed 
beyond the Federal Republic’s borders.133 With this remit, the Central 
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Office opened for business in December 1958 under its first director, 
the former lead prosecutor in the Ulm Einsatzgruppen trial, Erwin 
Schüle.134 
Given the creation of the Central Office and a renewed 
commitment to investigate the crimes of the Final Solution, the 
prospects for successful prosecution of Holocaust killers in West 
Germany would have seemed encouraging. However, there were 
systemic problems facing these trials. One of the most formidable of 
these was the lack in many cases of specific evidence proving criminal 
wrongdoing by suspected killers. The problem of evidence arose from 
the very nature of Holocaust crimes, in which most or sometimes all the 
victims had been killed. Documentation alone that linked a suspect with 
a unit involved in ghetto clearings or guard duty at a Polish death camp 
was not enough to secure a conviction, particularly where the potential 
defendant had no command authority.135 As Helge Grabitz, a former 
German prosecutor involved in trying Nazi crimes, has pointed out, this 
basic lack of available proof meant that only 20 of the 101 known 
ghetto clearings in the Lublin district of Poland—operations that sent 
thousands to their deaths in Belzec, Treblinka, and Sobibor—could be 
prosecuted.136  
A further obstacle to these trials was the distinction between 
perpetration and complicity in West German law, a difference already 
drawn in the Ulm Einsatzgruppen trial.137 The tendency of German 
courts after 1958 was to classify Nazi defendants as accomplices to the 
murder of the Jews, unless there was evidence that the defendant 
exceeded his orders—that is, unless he demonstrated his inward and 
subjective approval of the Holocaust.138 Merely following orders was 
not enough to convict a Nazi offender as a perpetrator of murder—the 
judge had to be satisfied that he had acted from “base motives.”139 In 
effect, this meant that there had to be proof the defendant acted 
sadistically or from racial hatred. In many cases, such evidence could 
only be provided by an eyewitness—and since the former camp 
personnel were understandably reluctant to incriminate themselves, 
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proving base motives was mostly done through Jewish survivor 
testimony.140  
In sum, even where the prosecutor could tie the defendant to a 
specific criminal act, additional proof was needed to show the defendant 
was a perpetrator rather than an accomplice. If such proof were 
unavailable, the court could only convict him of complicity to murder, 
which translated into a more lenient punishment.141 
IV. FIRST CONTACTS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL OFFICE AND THE ISRAELIS 
CONCERNING THE DEATH CAMPS 
Erwin Schüle, as head of the Central Office, was undoubtedly 
aware of the challenge of gathering evidence adequate to sustain 
indictments and convictions of death camp perpetrators. Hence, he must 
have regarded the prosecution of Adolf Eichmann as a heaven-sent 
boon.  
Eichmann was arrested in May 1960, and his trial began in April 
1961—during the time, in other words, when the Central Office was 
conducting investigations into Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka. Whether 
the Eichmann trial galvanized West German efforts to bring the 
executors of the Final Solution to justice has been a subject of 
controversy since the 1960s. Hannah Arendt believed the Eichmann 
trial was the trigger to the large death camp trials in the Federal 
Republic that followed in its wake.142 Schüle adopted a different view. 
He asserted that the origins of pending investigations of Nazi death 
camps preceded Eichmann’s arrest and trial.143 Whatever the merits of 
either position, one thing is indisputably clear: the Germans coordinated 
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with the Israelis in securing the names of Eichmann trial witnesses who 
could offer testimony at West German trials of Nazi perpetrators.144  
The earliest official contact between the Israelis and Central Office 
officials investigating Operation Reinhard crimes occurred in October 
1959, a time that preceded Eichmann’s arrest by seven months. The 
contact consisted of a letter in October 1959 signed by Werner, the 
investigating officer for the Belzec case, and addressed to the chief 
archivist of Yad Vashem, Dr. Josef Kermisz.145 The letter recounts the 
sources of Werner’s information on Belzec and ends with a request for 
the names and contact information of survivors who might reside in 
Israel.146  
In November, Yad Vashem responded to the Central Office’s 
inquiry.147 According to Kermisz, there was only one survivor of 
Belzec: a Lemberg Jew named Rudolf Reder, a name with which 
Dietrich Zeug, the Central Office official in charge of the Sobibor 
investigation, was already familiar. Kermisz was unsure whether Reder 
was still alive, but he knew Reder had written an account of his 
experiences at Belzec immediately after his liberation.148 The account 
was published in a volume edited by the former Crakow branch office 
of the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw. Kermisz also provided 
Werner with a reference to another book by Reder, devoted exclusively 
to Belzec, which was published in 1945. Kermisz also listed 17 names 
of suspects from the Belzec camp, including the assistant to the camp 
commandant, Josef Oberhauser, and Lawrence Hackenholt, whom 
Kermisz described as a chauffeur and machine operator involved in 
grave excavation.149   
Reder’s name had originally come to Zeug’s attention from his 
review of the literature150 and Werner’s October correspondence with 
Yad Vashem. In late October, Zeug had inquired of the International 
Tracing Service at Bad Arolsen about Reder’s whereabouts. Arolsen 
replied in early November that Reder had filed a claim for 
compensation with the Governmental District Office 
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(Regierungsbezirkamt) for Restitution in Mainz.151 Zeug followed up a 
week later with a letter to the Mainz Office, which replied with a 
confirmation of Reder’s application in late November. It also sent along 
Reder’s address and a copy of his application.   
Appended to the application was an autobiographical sketch from 
December 1954 describing Reder’s life before, during, and after his 
internment at Belzec. He was born in the Polish town of Dembica on 
April 4, 1881, but was living in Lwów152 when the Germans invaded the 
USSR. At that time he was the owner of the largest soap factory in the 
city. He was confined in the Lwów ghetto after its erection in December 
1941 and compelled to work as a slave laborer in his own soap factory, 
which the Germans had confiscated. On August 18, 1942, the Gestapo 
arrested him at home and took him to the military installation 
Podzamcza before internment in the Janowska camp—a 
labor/transit/concentration camp. His stay there was brief, for the next 
morning he and other prisoners were loaded amid a rain of blows into 
railcars at the Kleparow train station. The next stop was the Belzec 
death camp.153 
Reder arrived in Belzec on August 17, 1942. His railcar was 
unloaded and all save Reder and seven other men were immediately 
gassed. In what was a hallmark of Nazi institutionalized murder, the 
camp commandant, a Sudeten German named Fritz Irrmann, informed 
the deportees they would be assigned to labor details after a shower. 
Reder described the sequence of events: 
All the [recently arrived] prisoners were brought into a large 
barracks, where the women’s hair was cut. They were then driven 
into a narrow corridor; there was a door at the end with an 
inscription: “Bathing and Inhalation Rooms.” A flowerpot with a 
single flower hung in front of the door. Behind the door was another 
corridor, to the right were three doors and to the left three doors, 
which led into six gas chambers. Each chamber held 750 people. The 
building was made of concrete. I know from my own observation 
that the gassing took no longer than 20 minutes . . . .The gas was 
conducted through pipes powered by an engine located in a small 
cubicle. I operated a machine that excavated trenches designated as 
graves for the gassing victims. I also had to drag the corpses from the 
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gas chambers to the graves. Around 500 Jews were used in this last 
activity.154   
Three transports arrived every day during Reder’s time in the 
camp, each comprising fifty railcars of 12,000–13,000 Jews. Nearly all 
the deportees were murdered and buried by the evening of their arrival. 
Reder estimated the number of burial trenches at thirty; each was 100 
meters long, 25 meters wide, and 15 meters deep. As many as 10,000 
corpses could be buried in a single trench.155 When the grave was full, 
the corpses were doused with lime and the trenches filled in with 
sand.156   
In his interrogation by the Munich prosecutor’s office in August 
1960, Reder described how he escaped from Belzec. In November 1942 
he traveled by truck to Lviv with a driver and four Ukrainian guards in 
search of sheet iron to be used to build chimneys for ovens in the 
camp.157 After arrival, Reder spent the night in a Gestapo building. The 
next morning, he and the others loaded the iron. The guards left Reder 
in the company of another guard while they went to dinner. When the 
lone guard fell asleep in the truck, Reder slipped away and found refuge 
with a woman he knew and whom he would later marry. Remarkably, 
she lived in a building partly occupied by the Gestapo, and even worked 
as a cleaning woman in their offices. Reder hid in this very building 
until Lviv’s liberation by the Red Army. Irony piled on irony in the case 
of Rudolf Reder. His future wife cared for a dog belonging to the 
Gestapo. She diverted some of the meat given by Gestapo officials for 
the dog’s maintenance to Reder, who lived on it until liberation.158 
On November 30, 1959, Zeug sent a letter addressed to Reder to an 
address in Toronto provided by the Mainz Restitution Office. After a 
brief introduction informing Reder of the Belzec investigation, the letter 
acknowledged him as “the sole surviving eyewitness to escape from 
Belzec.” It then posed a series of questions to Reder, including whether 
he had observed specific crimes (especially murder) committed in the 
camp, and whether he was familiar with Josef Oberhauser and Gottfried 
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Schwarz.159 Zeug’s letter evoked no response from Reder. On January 7, 
1960, Zeug sent a second letter to Reder, indicating that Gottfried 
Schwarz was dead, and requesting information on Oberhauser, whom he 
characterized as adjutant to the Belzec camp commander, Christian 
Wirth.160  
On January 19, Reder replied to Zeug’s letter, denying any 
knowledge of Oberhauser. Zeug forwarded photos of Oberhauser to the 
World Jewish Congress in New York with the request they be sent to 
Reder for identification.161 Representatives of the World Jewish 
Congress then contacted Reder, secured two sworn statements from 
him, and forwarded these to the Central Office. The second of these 
signified a breakthrough in the Belzec case: Reder recognized Josef 
Oberhauser in the three photos shown to him. Reder wrote: 
“[Oberhauser] wore a cap in the Belzec camp, and I saw him only in a 
long SS dress coat. I am, however, certain that it is one and the same 
person.”162   
In March 1960, Schüle contacted Robinson at the World Jewish 
Congress, requesting that Reder travel to Munich and positively identify 
Oberhauser face-to-face. Months passed before Reder made the trip. 
The Munich prosecutor’s office conducted the interrogations on August 
8, 9, and 10, 1960. Ominously for the prosecution’s case, when 
confronted by Oberhauser, Reder claimed he had never seen him.163 
Consequently, the state court of Munich164 quashed the arrest warrant 
for Oberhauser on August 10, 1960. At the end of the first week in 
September, the senior prosecutor wrote Schüle that, unless 
incriminating evidence from Poland or the US National Archives 
emerged proving Oberhauser’s crimes at Belzec, the case against him 
would be dismissed.165  
Zeug responded with an internal memorandum in mid-September 
1960, urging that second interrogations of other perpetrators or former 
death camp insiders like Hermann Pfannenstiel, Kurt Franz, and 
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Heinrich Gley be conducted to elicit such evidence. Zeug also 
recommended that the trial records pertaining to T-4 crimes at Hadamar 
and Grafeneck be revisited, insofar as “ninety-two members of the 
‘Führer’s Chancellery’ were assigned to ‘Operation Reinhard’”—
meaning that a more thorough analysis of the trial documentation might 
yield the identities of witnesses capable of incriminating Oberhauser.166 
The memo pointed out that follow-up analyses of records at the Berlin 
Document Center had enabled the investigating magistrate in 
Düsseldorf to deepen his understanding of the personnel assigned to 
Treblinka. Zeug closed with a suggestion that the homes of Oberhauser, 
Unverhau, Girtzig, and Gley be searched. House searches of Treblinka 
suspects, including Franz and the widows of former Belzec 
commandants Christian Wirth and Gottlieb Hering, had produced 
valuable inculpatory materials like photo albums, photographs, and 
correspondence with other compromised persons.167  
Unsurprisingly, additional interrogations of Oberhauser ended in 
more equivocation and stonewalling. Oberhauser did not deny his 
presence at Belzec; rather, he insisted he was sent there, not to assist 
with the extermination of Jews, but “to gather war material in the area 
around Belzec.” The death camp had not yet been constructed when he 
arrived on the site in the fall of 1941. Oberhauser continued: 
My cleaning up operation lasted until the summer of 1942. Mostly I 
supervised 10 to 20 Ukrainians in transporting firearms, ammunition, 
barbwire, among other things, from the military equipment depot to 
Lubica and Ravaruska and loading them there in railcars. Sometime 
in the spring of 1942—there was still snow—the Belzec death camp 
was built. At first only barracks were set up, which were enclosed 
with barbwire. As far as I can remember, the SS Central 
Construction Management of Lublin was responsible for the camp’s 
construction; it used Polish civilian workers in this task. Later on the 
camp was continuously rebuilt and enlarged. This occurred under the 
supervision and direction of the camp commandant, with the 
assistance of Ukrainian units under his command. I would like to 
point out that I was never in Belzec for very long, but only for a few 
days. My longest stay lasted around 14 days, and this was at the 
beginning of the cleaning up operation.168 
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Oberhauser denied any involvement in constructing the gassing 
equipment and disclaimed knowledge of experimental gassings at the 
camp.169 The challenge facing the Central Office investigators and the 
Munich prosecutor’s office was to refute this defense. Curiously, the 
source of rebuttal came not from the lone surviving prisoner of Belzec, 
Rudolf Reder, but from other camp guards—Robert Lorent, Heinrich 
Gley, Werner Dubois, Karl Schluch, and Robert Jührs. On the strength 
of their interrogations, a new arrest warrant was issued for Oberhauser 
on November 20, 1961. The authorities arrested Oberhauser on 
December 4, 1961.170 Oberhauser was the leading defendant in the 
Munich prosecutor’s indictment of eight former Belzec staff members 
on August 8, 1963.171 
V.  EYELESS IN MUNICH: THE BELZEC INDICTMENT AND TRIAL 
The Munich prosecutor’s theory of criminal liability portrayed the 
Belzec defendants as accomplices in the murders committed in the 
death camp.172According to this theory—reminiscent of the Ulm court’s 
approach to the Tilsit Einsatzgruppen defendants in 1958—Hitler, 
Himmler, and Heydrich originated the plan for the Final Solution in the 
course of preparing for the invasion of the USSR. Implementation of the 
plan was entrusted to the SS. Nazi leaders assumed sole responsibility 
for the program of extermination. Rather than instigate the on-site actors 
to their crimes, the leadership made them responsible only for carrying 
out their orders. “[Nazi leaders] were the givers of orders who 
demanded unconditional obedience from their subordinates,” and thus 
the leadership qualified as “perpetrators actively willing an intentional 
killing.” The killing of hundreds of thousands of Jews at the death 
camps of Poland constituted murder under the German homicide law, 
section 211 StGB, because it was motivated by racial animus—a “base 
motive” under the statute.173 
Having branded Hitler and his closest henchmen as the “primary” 
murderers (Haupttäter), the indictment asserted the objective and 
subjective illegality of the genocide. “The objective illegality of the 
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ordered mass extermination of innocent people requires, in view of the 
monstrousness and brutality of the measure . . . no further proof.” 174 
Moreover, Hitler and his followers were aware of the illegality of their 
actions, as proven by the cloak of secrecy draped over the planning and 
execution of the Final Solution. As for the defendants, they were subject 
to a “special jurisdiction” by virtue of their membership in the SS, 
which made them amenable to the provisions of the 
Militärstrafgesetzbuch (Military Penal Code) as well as to the 
jurisdiction of SS and police courts. On this analysis, the orders of 
Heydrich’s office and its subsidiaries in the chain of command were 
equivalent to military orders. 
 According to the indictment, “the defendants ordered to assist in 
killing the Jews . . . had no opportunity for discretionary action.”175 
Hence, their criminal responsibility for carrying out orders was to be 
determined by section 47 of the Military Penal Code. Section 47 
ascribed fundamental responsibility to the commanding officer 
whenever the execution of his orders violated a criminal law.176 The 
subordinate carrying out these orders was punishable as an accomplice 
so long as he was aware of the criminal nature of the order. The 
prosecutor then applied the principles of liability under section 47 to the 
defendants in order to characterize them as accomplices: 
It is obvious that Hitler’s extermination order and the further orders 
issued for implementation of the crime . . . were contentually illegal. 
The illegality of the mass annihilation of innocent persons without 
respect to their age or gender was clear to the defendants, as they 
have admitted. They knew that the acts commanded of them were 
criminal and unjustifiable under any circumstances. The defendants 
are accordingly criminally liable as accomplices [Teilnehmer] for 
their actions in accordance with section 47 I 2b, Military Penal 
Code.177   
The indictment added that its classification of the defendants as 
accomplices was proper because “there was no indication the 
defendants, who were in a strict command relationship, had participated 
in the destruction of the Jews on their own initiative . . . . Likewise, no 
exceeding of orders is apparent.”178 Insofar as they had “supported 
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through their actions the purposes of the perpetrators, i.e., the actions of 
another,” they were accessories to murder.179 
The indictment brushed aside the arguments raised by the 
defendants that would later result in dismissal of the case against seven 
of them. Oberhauser, Gley, Jührs, Schluch, and Zierke claimed they had 
no possibility of escaping participation in mass murder at Belzec, and 
for this reason took no steps to evade their orders.180 They were fearful 
that refusal to follow orders would jeopardize their lives, resulting in 
either a death sentence pronounced by a military court for failing to 
obey an order, or summary execution for open insubordination.181   
While conceding Wirth’s brutality, the indictment dismissed the 
duress argument raised by Oberhauser on the ground that it did not fit 
his proven image as the “obedient subordinate, stooping to carry out 
criminal orders unconditionally out of loyalty to command authority and 
a falsely understood sense of duty.”182 For the prosecution, there was no 
sign that Oberhauser’s will had been “bowed by the generally prevailing 
situation of terror induced by the National Socialist state and by his 
superior Wirth.”183 The indictment likewise rejected the duress 
arguments of the other defendants, insofar as they could have tried to 
extricate themselves from participation in genocide without incurring 
Wirth’s wrath.184   
None of the accused denied his involvement in killing Jews at 
Belzec, nor did any of them deny knowing that the extermination of 
Jews at Belzec was wrongful. Rather, during the preliminary 
investigation conducted by the examining magistrate, the defendants 
invoked the defense of duress.185 They argued that they feared for their 
lives unless they complied with their superiors’ orders. Werner Dubois 
claimed he “inwardly” condemned the destruction of the Jews, but 
added that “an open refusal to obey orders” would have “certainly led to 
his own liquidation.”186 He recounted that during his work with the 
euthanasia program he had sought release from T-4, an effort that 
elicited warnings from his superior that if he persisted he would be sent 
to a concentration camp. Given Wirth’s “ruthlessness” and 
“unscrupulousness,” Dubois had little doubt that further requests for a 
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transfer would endanger his life. On one occasion, Wirth had threatened 
Dubois with his pistol, provoking Dubois to draw his own pistol in self-
defense. The triviality of the incident that prompted Wirth to threaten 
Dubois’s life foreshadowed Wirth’s likely response to the far more 
serious request for reassignment.187 
Fuchs and Unverhau likewise insisted they did everything in their 
power to reduce their participation in mass killing “to a minimum” and 
to secure a transfer from Belzec “as soon as possible.”188 Fuchs, like 
Dubois, claimed his superior officer in Berlin had threatened him with 
internment in a concentration camp should he try to dodge his service 
through “gimmicks.” Also like Dubois, he came to appreciate the 
suicidal nature of disobeying Wirth’s commands. Once, Fuchs tried to 
avoid an order from Wirth to install dummy showerheads in the gassing 
barracks. When Wirth discovered his dereliction, he struck Fuchs with 
his riding crop and ordered his execution.189 Only the intervention of his 
colleagues Fichtner and Niemann spared him this fate. According to 
Fuchs, this experience taught him that any opposition to Wirth’s orders 
would entail a “direct danger to his own life.” 190  
Unverhau recited a near facsimile of Dubois’s defense, claiming he 
was threatened with internment when he had sought reassignment from 
T-4.191 While on leave from his grisly chores at Belzec, he approached 
the T-4 offices about a transfer from the death camp. Wirth learned of 
Unverhau’s request and, on his return from leave, berated Unverhau in 
the presence of the other men.192 Wirth’s censure climaxed with Wirth 
drawing his gun and threatening to shoot Unverhau. Refusing a Wirth 
order was “equivalent to suicide.”193 
Gley, Jührs, Schluch, and Zierke reprised the same duress 
arguments as their co-defendants. They argued that “they had seen no 
practicable way to escape their participation in the extermination 
program.”194 The decree dismissing the case continued: 
For this reason they took no steps to avert their orders and carried 
them out. In the event of a refusal to follow orders—as they were 
convinced at the time—they would have risked their lives, insofar as 
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they would have either been sentenced to death by an SS and Police 
Court or shot without legal procedure on account of open defiance. 
This last possibility is a natural assumption based on the 
personalities of both camp commandants Wirth and Hering.195 
The prosecutor objected to this line of argumentation on the 
grounds that a “genuine condition of duress, such as presupposed by 
section 52 of the Penal Code, did not exist here.”196  
For the prosecution, the defendants were legally obligated to incur 
“a certain degree of risk in order to avoid involvement in the crimes.”197 
They could have sought a transfer during their furloughs outside the 
camp, and in this manner avoided the unpleasantries of filing such a 
request directly with Wirth or Hering. Imminent threats to their lives 
could thereby have been averted. The Munich regional court completed 
its summary of the prosecution’s counterargument: “The defendants had 
to accept being reviled as a coward or suffering disadvantages to their 
career.”198   
The court ultimately agreed with the defendants and dismissed the 
indictments against them.199 The verdict revealed the improbability of 
prosecuting death camp guards successfully in the absence of Jewish 
survivor testimony. The court began its analysis by noting that the mere 
assertion of duress was not enough to refute the charge of aiding and 
abetting murder at Belzec. The defendants also had to show that their 
claims of duress were supported by evidence (“factual indications”) 
before they could prevail.200 The threshold question, then, was whether 
the evidence presented was sufficient to bolster the defendants’ claim 
and stop the indictment against them in its tracks. The court answered 
this question in the affirmative: 
[I]n the case at bar the preliminary investigation has yielded 
numerous factual indications, showing that the defendants’ 
assertions they continuously sought release from the offices 
of T-4 (Fuchs, Unverhau), or saw no possibility of evading 
participation in the extermination of Jews at Belzec without 
endangering their lives and therefore carried out the orders 
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For the court, it was significant that none of the defendants 
occupied prominent positions within the Nazi state. They were forced to 
go to Lublin, where they were given nominal SS ranks and plugged into 
the lowest levels of a camp administration “built on military 
principles.”202 “Under these circumstances,” the court affirmed, “the 
possibilities available to the defendants for successfully avoiding 
participation in mass killing without considerable danger to their own 
person was at the outset restricted to a minimum.”203  
In assessing the range of discretionary action confronting the 
defendants, the court focused “not only on their subordinate positions,” 
but also on “the mentality of their superior officers.”204 Christian Wirth 
and Gottfried Hering were “characterized by all the defendants in the 
same way: they were not persons able to entertain any contrary ideas [to 
their own].”205 The court continued: 
[Wirth and Hering] were described as ruthless and fanatical National 
Socialists, from who it could be seriously feared they would react 
violently in the event the unconditional obedience they demanded 
were to be refused. The fact that Wirth was a person of almost 
unrivalled brutality emerges not only from his behavior toward the 
defendants Dubois, Fuchs, and Unverhau, but may also be 
considered proven based on the total results of the investigatory 
proceeding.206 
In sum, the defendants had good reason to fear that open refusal of 
orders—including the criminal orders authorizing and enforcing the 
Final Solution—could have led to their immediate punishment by an SS 
and Police court. Like the crime of desertion, which was punished with 
draconian ferocity in SS courts and in military courts-martial during the 
war, defiance of orders to participate in the genocide of Jews at Belzec 
would have resulted in “certain death.”207  
The court’s analysis accepted the defendants’ exculpatory claims 
on their face because no other evidence existed to contradict them. 
Thus, it was accepted as true that Dubois, Fuchs, and Unverhau did 
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indeed seek to extricate themselves from their work at Belzec. The court 
also assumed that these three defendants carefully considered the 
potential results of disobeying orders and determined that refusal would 
result in their own deaths. Instead, Fuchs and Unverhau sought to limit 
their involvement in the genocide as much as possible. Gley, Jührs, 
Schluch, and Zierke, on the other hand, did not try to secure 
reassignment from Belzec, but their inaction was due to their 
assumption that such efforts would be both hopeless and likely fatal to 
themselves. Given these circumstances—all of the allegations made by 
the defendants that were unrefuted by adverse witnesses—the court held 
that “intentional participation in a criminal act cannot be upheld against 
them.”208 
Elsewhere in its decree, the court appeared to follow a theory of 
Putativnötigungsstand (“putative duress”).209 On this theory, even if an 
actual situation of duress did not exist, the defense would nonetheless 
apply where the defendants genuinely believed they faced a danger to 
their own lives for refusing their orders.210 Whether actual or putative 
duress was applied, however, the result was the same: the case against 
the seven was dismissed, leaving Josef Oberhauser as the only 
remaining defendant when his trial began in January 1965.211  
Oberhauser, Wirth’s intimate and his liaison with Globocnik in 
Lublin, also tried to raise a duress defense. However, the panel of lay 
assessors was unconvinced. They found instead that he had never tried 
to escape or mitigate the tasks given to him; rather, he “implemented 
them in unswerving adherence to orders” without considering 
possibilities for avoiding them.212 In short, Oberhauser didn’t act with 
 
 208. Id. The court’s reasoning followed the regnant paradigm of criminal analysis in German 
law set forth by Ernst Behling in 1906, according to which proof of “guilt” (Schuld) was 
necessary for conviction even when the actor had fulfilled all the elements of the offense 
(Tatbestandsmäβigkeit). In the Belzec case, the defendants indeed fulfilled the elements of aiding 
and abetting murder, but no attribution of guilt was possible, given the context of duress in which 
they had allegedly acted. Hans Welzel, Die Deutsche Strafrechtliche Dogmatik der Letzten 100 
Jahre und die Finale Handlungslehre, 11 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 421 (1966).   
    209. See generally George Fletcher et al., European Responses to World War Two War 
Criminals and Human Rights Violators: National and Comparative Perspectives, 8 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 3, 14–15 (1988) (Symposium).  
 210. Id. 
 211. Decree of the 4th Penal Chamber of the Munich Regional Court I, supra note 187. The 
prosecution appealed the case to the appellate court of Munich (Penal Senate), which on July 22, 
1964, upheld the dismissal. The appellate court’s reasoning was identical to that of the regional 
court (at one point in the verdict, it virtually lifted a block of text from the regional court’s 
opinion), holding that the defendants’ defense of duress could not be disproven. Decree of the 
Appellate Court of Munich—Penal Senate, (July 22, 1964) (on file with BArch B 162/3172).  
 212. Josef Oberhauser Interrogation, ZStL 208 AR-Z 252/59 (Dec. 12, 1960). 
  
370 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 34:339 
the belief that he was enmeshed “in a hopeless dilemma.” The lay 
assessors based their interpretation on the proven fact that Wirth trusted 
Oberhauser as a fellow Nazi of impeccable reliability: “Oberhauser’s 
preferential position, which, in the eyes of bystanders, cast him as 
Wirth’s ‘adjutant,’ ‘constant companion,’ or ‘shadow,’ supports the 
inference that Wirth . . . believed he had found a man in the defendant 
who was, from an ideological perspective, reliable and from whom he 
expected no difficulties in implementing the measures of extermination 
ordered by the government.”213  
Even after Wirth’s promotion to inspector of the three death camps 
and his transfer to his new workplace in Lublin, he ensured that 
Oberhauser would be available to work for him in his new post. 
According to the court, “this fact likewise indicates that Wirth valued 
the defendant as a conscientious subordinate, one who supported the 
government without reservation and readily performed his service.”214 
Other features of Oberhauser’s service with Operation Reinhard 
undercut his defense that he had acted reluctantly and under duress. In 
March 1943, Himmler authorized the promotion of the “best men and 
leaders involved in [Operation Reinhard]” after visiting Belzec, 
Treblinka, and Sobibor.215 Based on Globocnik’s recommendation, 
which was influenced by Wirth, Oberhauser was promoted to 
Untersturmführer (SS-Lieutenant). The court observed that this 
elevation from a non-commissioned rank to an officer rank was 
exceptionally rare, particularly for persons of Oberhauser’s “educational 
background.”216 Such promotions were reserved for persons considered 
by the Nazi leadership to be “ideologically and militarily” 
irreproachable. From these predicate facts, the court concluded that 
Oberhauser “would never have been promoted to SS officer if he had 
condemned the measures ordered by the state authorities as a crime, 
thereby showing he lacked the unconditional obedience and hardness 
demanded of the SS officer.”217  
After the regional court rejected Oberhauser’s various defenses, it 
was faced with determining the crimes for which Oberhauser would be 
convicted. The Munich court followed the analysis of earlier West 
German trials related to the Nazis’ Final Solution. First, the court 
affirmed that the Final Solution met the Penal Code’s definition of 
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murder under section 211 (both the old and new versions).218 As we 
have seen, the newer version of section 211 defined a killing as murder 
when it was driven by “base motives” like racial animus or carried out 
in a “cruel” or “deceptive” manner.219 The process of mass murder at 
Belzec, as recounted by eyewitnesses, fulfilled each of these criteria.  
Moreover, the top Nazis who devised the scheme to murder 
Europe’s Jewish population knew their plan was illegal. They sought to 
conceal the Final Solution from the public by declaring it a “top secret 
matter” (Geheime Reichssache), the “highest level of secrecy” attached 
to a government program.220 On this analysis, then, Hitler and his 
confederates in crime were direct perpetrators acting in concert.  
How, then, did Oberhauser fit into this schematic of perpetration? 
To answer this question, the court agreed with the prosecution that 
Oberhauser was subject to a “special military judicial jurisdiction”221 
based on his membership in the SS. Therefore, Oberhauser was subject 
to the provisions of the German Military Penal Code and military 
criminal law, as well as the jurisdiction of the SS and Police Courts. 
Furthermore, the court declared that Hitler’s order to implement the 
Final Solution, including all subsequent orders to carry out the 
genocide, was a military command.222 This meant that Oberhauser’s 
offense had to be evaluated in light of section 47 of the Military Penal 
Code, which defined the criminal liability of subordinates acting on 
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orders of their superiors.223 According to section 47, the commanding 
officer bears sole responsibility if the performance of an order violates 
criminal law.224 The subordinate is liable as an accomplice if he was 
aware that the order involved actions “that aimed at a general or military 
crime or wrongful act.”225  
The court then applied these tenets of liability to Oberhauser’s 
case. “It is obvious,” explained the court, “that Hitler’s extermination 
order and the orders issued for its execution aimed at the commission of 
crimes—namely, the killing of human beings without any justification 
whatsoever—which were illegal based on their contents.”226 Oberhauser 
admitted he had understood the patent illegality of killing innocent men, 
women, and children, but claimed he had acted under duress. This 
defense, the court held, was not available to him: 
[I]n carrying out his orders, the defendant, as the disciple of the Nazi 
absolutist state and as an obedient SS non-commissioned officer, 
acted in unwavering devotion to his orders, never seriously 
considered disobeying these orders nor pondered the possibility of 
evading participation in the mass murder demanded of him.  
Accordingly, the criminal acts were not wrung from him through 
imminent threats to life and limb; his will wasn’t perverted through 
such a threat.227 
The regional court found that Oberhauser had assisted 
implementation of the Final Solution with full understanding of its 
illegality.228 He was aware of the cruelty of the killings carried out at 
Belzec, as well as of the fact that “the innocence and defenselessness of 
the victims were exploited.”229 However, he did not act “with the will of 
the perpetrator” (Täterwille).230 Rather, because no evidence was 
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presented at trial proving that he had ever exceeded his orders, 
Oberhauser had acted only with the “will of an accomplice” 
(Gehilfenwille).231 He was convicted of five counts of complicity to 
murder in the deaths of at least 150 Jews by supervising their unloading 
on arrival in the camp and one count of complicity in the deaths of at 
least 300,000 Jews by procuring building materials for the gassing 
facilities. After weighing factors in mitigation and aggravation, the 
court imposed a prison sentence of 4.5 years.232  
 Oberhauser’s conviction salvaged a largely failed effort to 
prosecute the staff at the Belzec death camp. Some of the acquitted were 
indicted in other Operation Reinhard trials involving Treblinka and 
Sobibor,233 while the rest were able to evade judicial punishment for 
their involvement in the Final Solution.234 With an acquittal rate of 
nearly 88 percent, it is hard to regard the Belzec trial as anything less 
than a debacle. The reason for its failure was a lack of witnesses able to 
contradict the defendants’ protests that they had acted under duress.235  
For example, the testimony of the lone Jewish survivor of Belzec, 
Rudolf Reder, was negligible to the outcome of the trial.236 The most 
incriminating evidence he offered—which, in the final analysis, counted 
for little in the court’s dismissal of charges against seven of the eight 
accused—was his statement that “reluctant conduct of the SS 
personnel” at Belzec was never apparent.237 The problem for the Belzec 
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trial was the Nazis’ lethal efficiency in eliminating human life, 
including the witnesses who could later testify against them. 
VI.  FORTUNE’S  SHIFTING SANDS: EICHMANN TRIAL WITNESSES  
AND THE WEST GERMAN TREBLINKA TRIAL 
Although the Israelis could not find survivors of Belzec as 
requested by the Ludwigsburg authorities, they were far more 
successful with Treblinka and Sobibor. In the fall of 1959, Tuviah 
Friedman, director of the Institute for the Documentation of Nazi War 
Crimes in Haifa, sent the Central Office in Ludwigsburg the names of 
ten survivors of Treblinka. Over the next four years, the Israelis 
provided the Central Office and the Düsseldorf prosecutor in charge of 
preparing the Treblinka trial with the statements of witnesses examined 
by the Israeli police. When the Düsseldorf prosecutor issued his 
indictment of fourteen members of the Treblinka death camp staff on 
January 29, 1963, the list of ninety-seven witnesses included at least 
four survivors who had testified at the Eichmann trial.238   
Ya’akov Wiernik was a Polish Jewish carpenter deported from 
Warsaw to Treblinka on August 23, 1942. Due to his carpentry skills, he 
was spared the fates of most Jews sent to Treblinka.239 During his one-
year imprisonment there, he and other “work Jews” built the 
guardroom, the entrance gate to the camp, and some of the camp’s 
barracks.240 At the Eichmann trial, Wiernik testified chiefly about the 
structure of the Treblinka camp, based on a detailed map he had drafted 
in 1944. Although his name rarely appears in the text of the Treblinka 
judgment, Wiernik was often cited as a government witness in the 
Düsseldorf prosecutor’s indictment. He testified at length not only about 
the dimensions of the camp, but also described atrocities committed by 
the defendants that he personally observed. He was an especially 
important witness for the prosecution in showing that the Final Solution 
at Treblinka met the criteria of murder under German Penal Code § 211, 
which, as we have seen, required a killing to bear certain legally defined 
characteristics. These included killings arising from base motives (i.e., 
racial hatred), deception, or cruelty.241 
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Wiernik, along with other Jewish survivors who had testified at the 
Eichmann trial,242 described how an orchestra consisting of camp 
prisoners, which, in the language of the indictment, played “in a 
cheerful and happy style,” greeted Warsaw deportees on arrival at the 
camp.243 The SS had arranged the orchestra for the purpose of reassuring 
the deportees as they were led to the gas chambers. Disguised as shower 
rooms, the killing facilities had signs posted along the way informing 
the victims that Treblinka was a “transit camp” from which they would 
later be sent to work camps. The final sentence on the signs indicated 
that all the deportees had to bathe in the interests of personal hygiene. 
Prisoners were required to disrobe and surrender all of their personal 
effects for disinfection. Receipts were given to them for their 
valuables.244 The fraud was then reinforced by speeches delivered by 
camp guards, reassuring the victims that they were merely being asked 
to shower before assignment to labor detail. Such duplicity, for both the 
prosecutor and the court, met the definition of Heimtücke (“deception”) 
under the German homicide law.245 
Wiernik also described scenes of pure horror, in which Jews 
stripped of their clothing shivered in the winter cold outside the gas 
chamber. As they waited for their promised shower, the screams of 
other Jews being gassed inside assailed their ears.246 Occasionally the 
diesel motors used to generate lethal carbon monoxide fumes broke 
down, and repairs lasting hours were made as the next group to be 
gassed froze outside in the bitter winter temperatures. For the prosecutor 
and the court, this aspect of the killing process met the element of 
Grausamkeit (“cruelty”) under the German homicide law.247 Wiernik 
and other Eichmann trial witnesses proved that the killings at Treblinka 
were murder. However, this by itself would not have been enough to 
secure convictions of the defendants. Specific contributions by each 
defendant to the mass murder had to be shown.  
Witness testimony was essential to the conviction of the most 
notorious figure among the defendants, Kurt Franz. Franz, in contrast 
with several of his co-defendants, denied every allegation made against 
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him.248 Although he was the worst of the accused, he contested every 
charge and at no point during or after the trial did he express the faintest 
degree of remorse for his actions or sympathy for the victims.249   
A member of the SS before the outbreak of the war, Franz was sent 
to Berlin in late 1939, where he was initiated into Operation T-4.250 
Franz was assigned to a camouflage office in charge of the “euthanasia” 
program, the Gemeinnützigen Stiftung für Anstaltspflege (“Charitable 
Foundation for Institutional Care”), and thereafter served in a series of 
killing centers: Grafeneck in Württemberg, Hartheim Castle near Linz, 
Sonnenstein in Saxony, and Brandenburg near Berlin. Between late 
1941 and early 1942, Franz was transferred to the actual executory 
organ of the euthanasia program, the Kanzlei des Führers (“Chancellery 
of the Führer”), where he served as a cook in the Chancellery’s 
building.251  
In spring 1942, Franz, who had by now risen to the rank of SS-
Scharführer (sergeant), was assigned to the guard force at the Belzec 
death camp, where he remained until summer 1942.252 He was 
subsequently transferred to Treblinka. On arrival he assumed command 
of the Ukrainian guards (the so-called “Hiwis,” or “volunteers”), but the 
range of his activities expanded significantly beyond supervising the 
Ukrainians.253 As the regional court of Düsseldorf found, Franz quickly 
became involved in administering the entire camp operation. Before 
long he had risen to the position of deputy commander of the camp, 
second only to Treblinka’s commandant at the time, SS-
Hauptsturmführer (Captain) Franz Stangl. In the words of the court, “in 
this capacity he held all the reins in his hand, exercising an unrestricted 
influence on the entire course of activities within the camp, particularly 
when the successor to Dr. Eberl . . . took little or no interest in the 
external operation of the camp . . . .”254   
As a ubiquitous figure inspecting work commandos and 
monitoring the camp equipment in both the upper and lower sections of 
Treblinka, Franz, in the words of the Düsseldorf court, “revealed a kind 
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of sadism and such contempt toward all Jewish life that can scarcely be 
envisioned by the human imagination.”255 His seemingly inexhaustible 
brutality was legendary. Jewish witnesses described Franz as the “terror 
of the camp.”256 In its verdict, the court stated that “a large part of the 
river of blood and tears that flowed through Treblinka may be laid 
solely to his account.”257 The court arrived at this conclusion based on 
testimony furnished by Eichmann trial witnesses. Wiernik, Kalman 
Taigman, Elihu Rosenberg, and Abraham Lindwasser testified that 
Franz never missed an opportunity to mistreat and kill Jewish 
prisoners.258 Taigman was among several survivor witnesses who 
recounted how Franz set his massive dog Bari on the hapless inmates, 
severely wounding them and, in some cases, tearing them apart.259  
Franz punished any prisoner resistance by executing the resister, 
often in a grisly fashion. Taigman described one such incident, in which 
Franz “selected” as many as 10 Jews and shot them with a pistol in front 
of their fellow prisoners.260 Franz was clearly a sadist, delighting in his 
malevolent power over the Jewish prisoners. He engaged in murderous 
“sport” shooting of Jews with other Treblinka guards and competed 
with them in contests to kill Jewish infants by smashing their skulls 
against the barracks wall.261  
Based on the voluminous witness testimony against him, the court 
had no trouble classifying Franz as a “co-perpetrator” (Mittäter), insofar 
as he subjectively identified with the Final Solution and strove with 
gusto and dedication to carry it out.262 He was found guilty of 
murdering at least 300,000 Jewish victims in connection with the Final 
Solution; he was also convicted as a perpetrator of murder in the deaths 
of at least 139 people, carried out entirely on his own initiative. The 
regional court sentenced him to a life prison term.263 
Two of Franz’s other colleagues at Treblinka were likewise 
convicted of murder and given life sentences, largely on the strength of 
Jewish survivor testimony (among them, former Eichmann trial 
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witnesses). Heinrich Arthur Matthes, who, like Franz, was a participant 
in the Nazi regime’s murder of the disabled, was sent to Globocnik’s 
office in Lublin in late August 1942. He received the rank of SS-
Scharführer before assignment to Treblinka.264 At Treblinka, he was in 
charge of the “upper camp,” comprising the extermination area. His 
duties included overseeing all operations within the upper camp and 
supervising the Arbeitsjuden (“work Jews”).265 Matthes was particularly 
concerned with ensuring the frictionless operation of the killing process. 
In fulfilling his tasks, the court found that Matthes was anything but 
“squeamish”:  
[Matthes] struck out with his leather whip at the prisoners whenever 
it seemed necessary to him, or had them beaten by the capos. He was 
lord over life and death of the Jews within the death camp 
subordinate to him, and he could as he wished either beat or have 
others beat the unfortunate people, but also kill them or have them 
killed, when they for example were no longer able to work or some 
other occasion arose.266 
Matthes’ defense was that he did nothing more than carry out the 
orders given him, which were to guarantee an orderly procedure within 
the upper camp.267 Matthes denied direct involvement in gassing Jews. 
He claimed he never drove Jews into the gas chambers because, “as a 
family man and nurse,” he did not “have the heart” to do it.268 He sought 
out ways to absent himself while the victims were murdered, such as by 
withdrawing into the kitchen of the upper camp to dine on soup.269 This 
defense, according to the court, was refuted by both Matthes’ former 
colleagues and by former Eichmann trial witnesses, who were 
characterized by the court as “the most reliable of the witnesses.”270  
These witnesses included Elihu Rosenberg and Abraham Lindwasser, 
who testified that Matthes, as the “highest authority and boss” of the 
extermination area, was present during the liquidation of the Jewish 
transports.271 
Not only did Matthes not retire into the kitchen to his soup, but he 
demonstrated a zealous commitment to “overcoming all difficulties that 
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arose with great strictness and brutality.”272 Rosenberg and Lindwasser 
testified that Matthes ordered the opening and shutting of the gas 
chambers and personally supervised the gassing process.273 Rosenberg’s 
testimony was especially damaging to Matthes, because he was able to 
precisely identify specific victims by name that Matthes had 
murdered.274 Lindwasser, on the other hand, was a crucial witness for 
the prosecution because of his ability to recall specific atrocities and to 
identify Matthes as the unquestionable perpetrator.275 
The final defendant at the Treblinka trial convicted as a perpetrator 
of murder was August Wilhelm Miete. Miete, like his colleagues, was a 
veteran of the Nazi euthanasia program—he worked at Grafeneck and 
incinerated the corpses of murder victims at Hadamar.276 Sometime 
between late June and early July of 1942 he arrived in Lublin, donned 
the field-gray uniform of a SS-Unterscharführer (“Lance Sergeant”), 
and left for Treblinka. His duty station centered on the lower camp. 
Together with other SS men, Miete shot elderly and ill Jews culled from 
arriving transports.277 The victims were murdered in the camp clinic. He 
also supervised commandos sent outside the camp to collect wood and 
to perform other chores. One of his main functions was to supervise the 
Sortierplatz (“sorting place”), where the victims’ clothing was searched 
and packaged for shipment back to the Reich.278  
Taigman was among the congeries of witnesses who attested to the 
besonderen Eifer (“special zeal”) with which Miete performed his 
duties. In unloading Jewish transports and herding them toward the gas 
chambers, he “drove them in haste so as to preclude any reflection, 
making frequent use of his whip. In many cases he also used his gun.”279 
According to the court, Miete “moved like an evil spirit” through the 
camp, dispensing death wherever he turned, thereby earning the 
nickname among the prisoners of Todesengel (“angel of death”).280   
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The Düsseldorf regional court followed the analysis of the court in 
the Ulm Einsatzgruppen case. The architects of the Final Solution—the 
Nazi leadership (Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich, and Goering) but also 
intermediate functionaries in the machinery of destruction (Globocnik 
and Wirth)—were the main perpetrators of the Holocaust, while their 
underlings who personally supported the genocide of the Jews were 
guilty of mass murder as co-perpetrators. The defendants shared with 
the top-level Nazis their racist loathing for the Jews. Franz 
demonstrated “boundless zeal,” an “energy,” and a “persistence” in his 
contributions to the murder of Jews and the Roma that was “in no way 
inferior to the initiators of the crime.”281 Matthes’ “cruelty” and 
“stubbornness” proved his “considerable agreement with the goals of 
the National Socialist government.”282 Miete was a “bloodthirsty sadist 
and a pitiless executioner” who exhibited an “unnatural joy in 
killing.”283 All were convicted of murdering hundreds of thousands of 
victims and sentenced to life terms in prison.284 
VII.  SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE:  EICHMANN WITNESSES  
AT THE SOBIBOR TRIAL 
The West German inquiry into the Sobibor death camp emerged 
from the Central Office’s investigations into Treblinka and Chelmno. 
One of the Treblinka witnesses reported to the Israelis the name of a 
Sobibor survivor, Edda (Ada) Lichtmann.285 A Polish Jew from Crakow, 
she was transported with 7,000 other Jews to Sobibor in June 1942.286 
On arrival, she and two other women were selected for work in the 
camp’s laundry facility; all other women in the transport were gassed. 
She and her two companions were housed in a small forest cabin 
situated in a wooded area in Camp I (the administrative sector) near the 
assembly point where recently arrived Jews were brought.287 “It was so 
near,” Lichtmann reported, “that the people were only a few meters 
away from me.”288 From this vantage point, she was able to observe the 
arrivals of transports from Germany, Austria, Holland, France, and 
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Czechoslovakia. She was also in a position to see interactions between 
the SS guards and the arriving Jews.289 
In late February 1960, Dietrich Zeug contacted Yad Vashem 
requesting a statement from Lichtmann concerning her experiences in 
Sobibor.290 One day later, Zeug asked an Israeli delegation in Cologne to 
arrange for the interrogation of Sobibor survivors living in Israel. Zeug 
identified nine survivors; four of the nine would later testify at both the 
Eichmann trial in Jerusalem and the West German trial of eleven former 
Sobibor guards in 1965.291 As his colleagues did in their investigation of 
Belzec and Treblinka, Zeug appended a list of questions to be posed to 
the witnesses. The most significant of these probed the witnesses’ 
knowledge of the names, ranks, and physical appearance of former SS 
guards in the camp, and asked them to identify specific crimes 
committed by these persons that the witnesses had observed with their 
own eyes.292   
This witness list was sent to the Israeli delegation and included the 
names of Lichtmann and Moshe Bahir. Both would later offer powerful 
testimony against Adolf Eichmann. Their testimony against former 
Sobibor guards proved similarly effective. They were among the group 
of six witnesses who identified Karl Frenzel from photographs shown 
them during the investigation.293 After the suicide of the leading 
defendant in the case, Kurt Bolender, on October 10, 1966, Frenzel 
became the focus of the regional court's verdict.294 A carpenter and 
butcher before the outbreak of the war, Frenzel worked in the euthanasia 
gassing centers at Grafeneck, Hadamar, and Bernburg before his 
assignment as an SS Staff Sergeant to Sobibor in the spring of 1942.295  
Moshe Bahir related acts of brutality committed by Frenzel against 
Jewish prisoners, including one of the most appalling episodes of the 
many told during the trial. Bahir testified that Frenzel had discovered 
that a work Jew had tried to commit suicide by slashing his wrists. As 
the prisoner lay dying, Frenzel had him carried from his barracks to the 
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parade ground. Frenzel verbally abused the dying man, struck him with 
his whip, and shot him in the presence of the assembled work Jews.296 
Before dispatching the wretched man with his pistol, Frenzel addressed 
himself to his audience, admonishing them that no Jew had the right to 
take his own life; the decision over the life and death of Jews resided 
only with the Germans. Only the Germans, said Frenzel, had the right to 
kill.297   
Adda Lichtman related an incident in which Frenzel caught an 11-
year-old Jewish boy with a can of sardines. Frenzel took the boy to the 
sorting barracks where Lichtman worked, ordering the work Jews there 
to watch the boy’s fate. He forced the boy to hold the can over his head 
as Frenzel proclaimed that no Jew was permitted to eat foreign sardines. 
He then drew his pistol and shot the boy in full view of the assembled 
work Jews.298  
Jakob Biskiewicz and five other survivor witnesses laid the 
foundation of Frenzel’s conviction for killing 200 Jews selected from a 
transport that arrived in Sobibor on June 10, 1942.299 The doomed 
transportees from Biala Podlaska were unaware that Sobibor was an 
extermination camp. One of them submitted a petition to the guards 
requesting that they be treated well. The guards, enraged by this 
“outrageous” and “insolent” conduct, decided that the Jews would pay 
for their effrontery.300 Most of the transport Jews were sent to the gas 
chambers, but 200 of them were forced to load packets from the sorting 
barracks in Camp II into empty boxcars at the ramp. They performed 
this chore at a constant run while the Germans and Ukrainians formed a 
Gasse (alley) through which they had to run amid blows from clubs and 
whips.301 As they moved through the Gasse, the dog Bari, brought to 
Sobibor from Treblinka, was set on them for the sole purpose of 
terrorizing and wounding the prisoners. Afterwards they were liquidated 
in the gas chambers.302 
 Biskiewicz and other witnesses recalled the Gasse incident and 
unanimously placed Frenzel at the scene. One of Frenzel’s co-
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defendants, Kurt Bolender, confirmed the Jewish witness statements, 
adding that he had spoken with Frenzel several days after the alley 
incident.303 Frenzel told him “he had missed out on the great fun, people 
arrived with a petition, the Ukrainians were mustered, and the Jews 
were beaten and battered.”304 
Another witness, Berek Freiberg,305 testified to what the regional 
court called eigenmächtige Tötungen (“unauthorized killings”) by 
Frenzel—that is, murders perpetrated entirely on Frenzel’s own 
initiative without the promptings of an order.306 These included two 
gratuitous shootings. The first involved a transport of Jews who had 
perished from hunger and debilitation during their lethal train journey to 
the camp. Freiberg, a work Jew, discovered a man who had survived the 
trip lying among the litter of corpses. Freiberg attended to him, helping 
the distraught man to sit up as Freiberg consoled him. When Frenzel 
noticed this act of compassion, he struck Freiberg repeatedly in the face 
and shot the survivor on the spot.307 
 The second incident was strikingly like the first: as Freiberg was 
dragging what he assumed was a dead body to a rail car, the “corpse” 
sat up and asked Freiberg “whether it was still far away.”308 Freiberg 
took his arm and escorted him to the rail car. Frenzel then arrived on the 
scene, saw that the victim was still alive, and struck Freiberg with his 
whip. Freiberg released the victim, who fell to the ground. Frenzel shot 
him with his pistol.309 The regional court apparently felt moved to 
append a moral and legal assessment310 of this dreadful incident 
immediately after its recitation in the judgment: “[Frenzel] acted here 
from his arrogance toward a Jew he regarded as a racial inferior, as well 
as from a zeal in killing. Therefore he exceeded without thought the 
scope of the commanded extermination procedure, according to which 
debilitated Jews were to be taken for killing in Camp III.”311  
Based on these and other events corroborated by Jewish survivors, 
the Hagen court found that Frenzel’s killings were actuated by “base 
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motives”—that is, a personal joy in murdering the Jews he considered 
racial inferiors.312 He was convicted as a co-perpetrator in the murders 
of at least 150,000 people and as a perpetrator acting alone in nine 
instances. The court imposed a life sentence.313   
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The survivor-witnesses of Treblinka and Sobibor who testified 
against Eichmann in his 1961 trial faced a very different task than 
witnesses in the West German trials. Eichmann was not a low-level, 
hands-on perpetrator of Holocaust violence but a mid-level bureaucrat, 
albeit one with inordinate influence and powerful connections, who 
designed train schedules and organized deportations to the camps. 
Given his prominence within the system of death created by Nazi 
leaders, it was enough to prove the appalling reality of the Final 
Solution in order to convict him under Israeli law. This notwithstanding, 
the Israeli prosecutor Gideon Hausner strove in vain to prove a single 
case in which Eichmann had murdered anyone with his own hands.314 
Efforts to link Eichmann with the murder of a Hungarian boy, the 
Einsatzgruppen shooters in the east, or the organization and 
maintenance of the Operation Reinhard camps all came to nothing and 
the Israeli court dismissed each of these charges against him.315 
Nonetheless, Eichmann’s very real contributions to the Holocaust—
particularly his merciless on-site exertions to deport Hungarian Jews to 
the death camps and damning evidence of his personal zeal and anti-
Semitism—ultimately led to his conviction and execution.316 
The situation was quite different in the West German death camp 
trials. There, it had to be proved that men lacking command authority 
had performed specific acts in violation of the German homicide law. 
Mere presence in the death camp as a guard was not enough. In 
proceedings where such proof was lacking, as at the abortive trial of 
Belzec camp guards in January 1964, judges dismissed the case against 
them. Jewish survivors who had testified against Eichmann provided the 
critical evidence in the Treblinka and Sobibor trials that enabled the 
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prosecutors to avoid this outcome. They not only tied the defendants to 
murders within the camp, but also showed that their crimes met the 
definition of perpetration under German homicide law. On the strength 
of their testimony, the likes of Kurt Franz and Karl Frenzel were 
convicted and given life sentences.   
As we have seen, the first of the Operation Reinhard trials, Belzec, 
was not a total failure. It successfully convicted Josef Oberhauser of 
complicity to mass murder. His factually verified position within the 
camp command structure was decisive in his conviction. His close 
relationship with Wirth, his reputation as a stalwart National Socialist 
that spurred his rapid ascent from non-commissioned to officer rank, 
and his punctilious execution of his duties within the camp all belied his 
claims of duress and inner rejection of genocide. The court’s analysis of 
Oberhauser’s guilt was legally unobjectionable. Likewise, its 
classification of Oberhauser as an accomplice rather than a perpetrator 
of murder was in keeping with the prevailing jurisprudence in Nazi-era 
cases tried in West German courts.  
The Munich regional court did not invent the Gehilfen-Judikatur 
(“accomplice jurisprudence”). This phrase is often applied as an epithet 
to the judiciary’s practice of categorizing simple orders-followers as 
accomplices while reserving the more serious label “perpetrator” for 
high-ranking officials and Nazi killers who exceeded their orders. 
Oberhauser’s classification as an accomplice was consistent with the 
rules of complicity in West German criminal law. A close reading of the 
investigation and trial yields no signs that the West German authorities 
were biased in his favor. 
Additionally, a study of the Belzec proceedings shows that Jewish 
survivor-witnesses were critical to successful prosecution, particularly 
of low-ranking guards lacking command authority. Such a thesis 
becomes even more persuasive when we consider the main Treblinka 
trial in Düsseldorf. Where Belzec marked the nadir of West German 
prosecutions related to the Operation Reinhard camps, Treblinka was a 
triumph. It was the anti-Belzec, the vindication of Ludwigsburg’s 
exhaustive research and coordination. Like the Eichmann trial that 
preceded it, the Treblinka proceeding afforded a place for Jewish 
survivors to bear witness against their former tormentors. The victims 
were not the nameless and faceless dead, as at the Belzec trial; they 
were living, flesh-and-blood people with agile and retentive minds. 
Their ability to refute the defenses of mass murderers was the crucial 
factor in the trial’s success. 
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In a perfect world, we might lament the delay in justice served. We 
would deprecate the limitations of German law, with its distinction 
between accomplices and perpetrators, its statute of limitations, and its 
stubborn insistence on proof of a specific criminal act before convicting 
a death camp guard. We would find fault with the Germans for focusing 
on lower-level actors and their sensational crimes while exempting 
higher-ranking professionals, like special court judges and Wehrmacht 
officers, from criminal investigation. However, we would do well to 
remember that for all their flaws, the conviction and punishment of men 
like Oberhauser, Franz, Matthes, Miete, and Frenzel was a victory in the 
cause of justice—a victory made possible by Jewish survivors and their 
willingness to re-live the traumas and terrors of the death camp. 
 
